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DOUGLAS v. SEACOAST PRODUCTS, INC.: THE LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR
THE MARYLAND OYSTERY*
THOMAS B. LEwIs** AND IvAR E. STRAND, JR.***
INTRODUCTION
While the management of the oyster resources 6f the Chesapeake
Bay has been the subject of great volumes of research,' little
attention has been focused on the relationship between the mobility
of watermen and the success of those management practices. The
mobility of Chesapeake Bay watermen is presently restricted by
state residency requirements in both Maryland and Virginia, which
reduce the number of oystermen in each state and help protect the
resource from overharvesting. Furthermore, these entry restrictions
allow each state to manage its oyster fishery independently and
exclusively, although this practice may not promote the greatest
productivity for the Chesapeake Bay as a whole.
* The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance rendered by Renee Laniado
and David Swartz.
Funding support was provided by the University of Maryland Sea Grant
Program pursuant to a grant from NOAA, Office of Sea Grant, Department of
Commerce. Additional computer funds were provided by the Computer Science Center,
University of Maryland. Professor Garrett Power of the University of Maryland
School of Law was the project's principal investigator.
** B.A. 1972, J.D. 1976, University of Maryland; formerly Staff Attorney,
Chesapeake Bay Foundation; Associate, Rich & Janney; Lecturer in Environmental
Law, University of Delaware College of Marine Studies.
*** B.A. 1967, University of Rochester; M.A. 1972, Ph.D. 1975, University of
Rhode Island; Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource
Economics, University of Maryland.
1. See, e.g., Alford, The Role of Management in Chesapeake Oyster Production,
63 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 44 (1973); Power, More About Oysters Than You Wanted to
Know, 30 MD. L. REV. 199 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Power, More About Oysters]; F.
Christy, Jr., The Exploitation of a Common Property Natural Resource: The
Maryland Oyster Industry (1964) (unpublished University of Michigan Ph.D.
dissertation available from University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Mich.).
(1)
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Recent decisions of the Supreme Court, in particular, Douglas v.
Seacoast Products, Inc., 2 portend a substantial possibility that
Maryland watermen will ultimately be permitted to harvest oysters
in Virginia waters and Virginia watermen will gain access to
Maryland waters. Thus, it is particularly important to assess the role
of watermen mobility and restraints on mobility in the management
of the oyster fisheries on the Chesapeake Bay at this time. This
article will first examine the legality of Maryland's residency
requirements for oyster licensees in light of these decisions, and will
then attempt to assess the probable consequences of the interstate
mobility that will almost certainly result from them. The probable
impact of Douglas and other recent Supreme Court decisions will be
examined through analysis of the economic consequences of an
analogous. decision in which the Maryland Court of Appeals struck
down county residency requirements for Maryland watermen.
The Future of State Residency Requirements
for Chesapeake Bay Oystermen
Maryland law provides that "[a]ny resident of the state may
catch oysters or clams on any area in the waters of the state from
which catching oysters or clams is permitted under the provisions of
this subtitle. ' 3 This restriction is enforced by the requirement that a
person obtain a license before engaging in commercial oyster
harvesting4 and, because a license may only be obtained by a person
who has been a resident of Maryland for the preceding twelve
months,5 the practical consequence of these provisions is that
watermen who are new residents of Maryland or who reside in
Virginia are prevented from harvesting oysters from public oyster
bars in Maryland.
The twelve month waiting period for new Maryland residents
would almost certainly be found to be an unconstitutional burden on
the fundamental right to travel if this requirement were challenged
in the courts.6 A more difficult legal question, however, is presented
2. 431 U.S. 265 (1977). Other relevant decisions include City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531 (1978); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 98 S. Ct. 2482 (1978).
3. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §4-1003 (1974). The states of Maryland and
Virginia have agreed to share access to the Potomac River oyster beds to the
exclusion of any other state's citizens. Id. § 4-306 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977) (Potomac
River Compact of 1958).
4. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 4-1004(b) (1977).
5. Id.
6. Durational residency requirements discriminate against new residents while
favoring older residents. There is seldom a reasonable basis for such discrimination,
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by the outright exclusion of nonresident watermen. While this
restriction will remain in effect until repealed by the General
Assembly or invalidated by a court, the Supreme Court's ruling in
Douglas strongly suggests that federally licensed vessels from other
states will eventually join Maryland's commercial oyster fleet.
The conflict presented in Douglas arose when the Commissioner
of Virginia Marine Resources refused to issue a license to a
subsidiary of Seacoast Products, Inc., which would have allowed the
company to catch menhaden in Virginia's territorial waters. His
refusal was based upon a Virginia law which made the nonresident
company ineligible for a commercial fishing license. The Virginia
Code prohibited persons other than Virginia residents from fishing
for menhaden in the Virginia portion of the Chesapeake Bay.7
However, nonresident corporations were eligible for menhaden
licenses allowing them to fish in the three mile wide marginal sea
along Virginia's eastern coast if United States citizens owned and
controlled at least seventy-five percent of the corporation's stock.8
Seacoast Products was incorporated in Delaware, maintained its
principal offices in New Jersey, and was qualified to do business in
Virginia.9 In 1973 Seacoast was sold to Hanson Trust, Ltd., a British
company, whose stock was held almost entirely by aliens. 10 Because
Seacoast was no longer owned by United States citizens, it was
prohibited under Virginia law from fishing for menhaden in the bay
as well as in the marginal sea.
After the denial of its license application, Seacoast filed a
complaint in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia challenging the constitutionality of the Virginia statutes.
Seacoast Products, Inc. v. Douglas," was heard by a three-judge
panel which struck down the challenged statutes, reasoning that the
citizenship requirement was preempted by a federal statute and that
the residency restriction violated the fourteenth amendment. 12 The
which discourages individuals from exercising the fundamental right to travel; "the
right of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new residents the same right to
vital government benefits and privileges in the States to which they migrate as are
enjoyed by other residents." Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,
261 (1974). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 387 F. Supp. 373 (D. Me. 1974); Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 162-65 (Alaska 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 98 S. Ct. 2482
(1978).
7. VA. CODE § 28.1-60(1), -60(2) (1950) (repealed 1978).
8. VA. CODE § 28.1-81.1 (1976) (repealed 1978).
9. 431 U.S. at 269-70.
10. Id.
11. Civil Action No. 75-69-NN (E.D. Va. Nov. 7, 1975) (unreported).
12. Id. at 2.
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three-judge court agreed with Seacoast's contention that "since the
licenses are granted to Virginia domestic and resident corporations
but refused nonresident corporations, there is discrimination in
contravention of the fourteenth amendment assurance of equal
protection of the laws,"'1 3 relying principally upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission 4
which held that the fourteenth amendment was violated by a state's
refusal to issue a commercial fishing license to a lawfully resident
alien. A second basis for the lower court's decision in Douglas was
that Virginia laws regulating the citizenship of fishermen in state
waters were preempted by the Bartlett Act,'5 which provided a
regulatory scheme for controlling fishing activities of foreign vessels
while in the territorial waters of the United States. The court stated
that, in its judgment, "this legislation preempted Virginia's control
of commercial sea fisheries and superseded the State's regulation of
them" and that "prevention of incursions by foreigners is the
responsibility exclusively of the Federal government.' 16
The state of Virginia appealed that ruling to the Supreme Court
which affirmed the decision on another ground. 17 The Court stated
that it was unnecessary to reach the constitutional questions raised
by the parties,' 8 because it found that the Virginia statutes were
preempted by federal vessel enrollment and licensing laws. 19 The
Court ruled that:
13. Id. at 4.
14. 334 U.S. 410 rehearing denied, 335 U.S. 837 (1948). The Seacoast court also
noted that the Supreme Court in Takahashi and in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385
(1978), declined to treat its earlier decision in McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876),
as authority for allowing state discrimination in fishery laws. In the McCready case,
decided over a century ago, the Court upheld a state law prohibiting persons other
than Virginia citizens from planting oysters in Virginia waters.
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1081 (1970) (repealed 1976).
16. Seacoast Products, Inc. v. Douglas, Civil Action No. 75-69-NN at 5-6 (E.D.
Va. Nov. 7, 1975).
17. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
18. Id. at 272. The Court stated that although the preemption claim was basically
constitutional in nature, deriving its force from the supremacy clause, it is tested as
"statutory" for purposes of deciding statutory claims first to avoid unnecessary
constitutional adjudication. Id. While a preemption question might be characterized
as a constitutional question since it involves the application of the supremacy clause
to an apparent conflict of federal and state law, the focus of the Douglas decision was
the construction and effect of federal vessel licensing laws.
19. Such laws provide that:
Vessels engaged in domestic or coastwise trade or used for fishing are
"enrolled" under procedures established by the Enrollment and Licensing Act
of Feb. 18, 1793, 1 Stat. 305, codified in 46 U.S.C. § 12. "The purpose of an
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Insofar as these state laws subject federally licensed vessels
owned by nonresidents or aliens to restrictions different from
those applicable to Virginia residents and American citizens,
they must fall under the Supremacy Clause. As we have noted
above, however, reasonable and evenhanded conservation
measures, so essential to the preservation of our vital marine
sources of food supply, stand unaffected by our decision.20
Because Seacoast's vessels had been properly enrolled and were
licensed under federal law to catch any type of fish, the Court
concluded that they had been granted the right to fish in Virginia
waters on the same terms as Virginia residents.21 In so ruling, the
Douglas Court added one more chapter to the historical debate over
the intended effect of the Enrollment and Licensing Act, which was
first enacted in 1793.22 Its opinion recognized that commentators
from Thomas Jefferson to Felix Frankfurter have criticized the view
that federal vessel licenses granted rights to coastal trade and
fishing which could not be abrogated by the states.23 The Court
refused to construe federal enrollment and licensing laws as merely
a means of providing evidence of the national character of American
vessels, however, because it viewed the landmark case of Gibbons v.
Ogden,24 decided thirty yearsr after the passage of the Licensing Act,
as persuasive authority for the proposition that the federal statute
was intended to confer authority upon enrolled vessels to "carry on"
the activity for which they are licensed.
In Gibbons the Court had ruled that a New York statute creating
a steamboat monopoly in New York waters was preempted by the
federal laws under which a would-be competitor had enrolled and
licensed his vessel. Because Gibbons' steamboat was federally
licensed to engage in the coasting trade, the Court held that the
license not only identified the national character of the vessel, but
also conveyed the right to transport passengers and freight in
enrollment is to evidence the national character of a vessel ... and to enable
such vessel to procure a ... license." The Mohawk, [70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 566, 571
(1866)]; Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., [255 U.S. 187, 199 (1912)].
A "license," in turn, regulates the use to which a vessel may be put and is
intended to prevent fraud on the revenue of the United States. See 46 U.S.C.
§§ 262, 263, 319, 325 ... ; 46 CFR § 67.01-13 (1976). The form of a license is
statutorily mandated ....
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. at 273.
20. 431 U.S. at 286-87.
21. Id. at 281.
22. Act of Feb. 18, 1973, 1 Stat. 305 (1850).
23. 431 U.S. at 278-79 nn.13 & 15.
24. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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coastal waters free from state-created monopolies. 25 The Court in
Douglas, by analogy, reasoned that because Seacoast held federal
licenses "to carry on" a mackeral fishery which, pursuant to statute,
authorized "the taking of fish of every description, '26 it not only
identified the enterprise pursued but also authorized Seacoast to
carry on that enterprise:
And just as Gibbons and its progeny found a grant of the right
to trade in a State without discrimination, we conclude that
[Seacoast's vessels] have been granted the right to fish in
Virginia waters on the same terms as Virginia residents. 27
The holding in Douglas strongly suggests that a federal vessel
license entitles a nonresident to harvest oysters as well as finfish in
Maryland on the same terms as residents. The license under scrutiny
in Douglas authorized "the taking of fish of every description,
including shellfish,"28 and the absence of limiting or qualifying
language in the Court's opinion will make it very difficult for a court
to find a basis for treating state residency requirements for oystering
more favorably than the Virginia menhaden laws which were
invalidated. The Court's narrow approach, motivated by its
traditional preference for avoiding "unnecessary" constitutional
questions, suggests a result which conflicts with its earlier decision
in McCready v. Virginia.29 In grounding its holding on preemption
by a federal statute rather than the Constitution, the Court provides
little guidance as to constitutional limitations on state fishery
discriminations which do not involve federal licenses.30
As if it were uneasy with the narrow rationale for the result, the
majority in Douglas declared in dicta, that its decision was
supported by policy considerations of federalism which required that
interstate commerce in coastal fisheries not be burdened by local
discriminations based on claims of title or ownership asserted by the
states. 31 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Powell in a separate
25. Id. at 212-14.
26. 46 U.S.C. § 263 (1976).
27. 431 U.S. at 281.
28. 46 U.S.C. § 263 (1976) (emphasis added).
29. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
30. Vessels which displace less than five tons (including many traditional
Chesapeake Bay workboats) are not eligible for federal licenses. 46 C.F.R.
§67.07-13(a). Whether these vessels and their owners may be excluded by state
residency requirements cannot be determined by the theory relied upon in the Douglas
opinion.
31. 431 U.S. at 284-87.
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opinion, concurred in the holding that federal licensees were granted
the right to fish in coastal waters on the same terms as any other
fisherman,32 but protested the failure of the majority to recognize the
substantiality of the state interests at stake:
[T]he States have a substantial proprietary interest - some-
times described as "common ownership," Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896) - in the fish and game within their
boundaries. This is worthy of mention not because it is
inconsistent with anything contained in the Court's opinion, but
because I am not sure that the States' substantial regulatory
interests are given adequate shrift by a single sentence casting
the issue of state regulation as "simply whether the State has
exercised its police power in conformity with the federal laws
and Constitution."33
The principal remaining source of legal support for a state's
exclusion of nonresidents from its oyster fishery is the McCready
case, decided in 1876.34 McCready was a Maryland waterman who
was convicted under a Virginia law prohibiting a nonresident from
planting or taking oysters in Virginia waters. He appealed the
conviction to the Supreme Court, contending both that the law
violated the privileges and immunities clause, and that it unlawfully
interfered with interstate commerce.35 The latter argument was
summarily dismissed by the Court, which stated that the planting
and harvesting of oysters was not an aspect of commerce and that
no issue involving interstate commerce was raised.36 This commerce
clause analysis, however, has since been discredited, as the majority
opinion in Douglas notes.37
32. Id. at 287.
33. Id. at 287-88 (Rehnquist & Powell, J.J., concurring) (quoting id. at 284-85).
34. Justice Rehnquist cited McCready as one of several cases "consistent in
recognizing that the retained interests of States in such common resources as fish and
game are of substantial legal moment, whether or not they rise to the level of a
traditional property right." Id. at 288.
35. 94 U.S. at 392-94.
36. Id. at 396-97.
37. While appellant may be correct in arguing that at earlier times in our
history, there was some doubt whether Congress had power under the
commerce clause to regulate the taking of fish in state waters,' 6 there can be
no question today that such power exists where there is some effect on
interstate commerce. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942).
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1977). In its footnote 16, the
Court cited McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395 (1877). 431 U.S. at 281.
19781
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The tension between McCready and Douglas runs deeper than a
difference as to whether the taking of fish in state waters is a part of
interstate commerce. Indeed, McCready had raised, without success,
an argument nearly identical to that which prevailed in Douglas,
contending that the state law restricting the shipment by nonresi-
dents of oysters into Virginia for cultivation was "in conflict with
... the laws of the United States relating to the coast trade. '38
Statements in Douglas to the effect that fishing in coastal waters is
a part of interstate commerce and that federal vessel licenses grant
rights preemptive of state discriminations against nonresidents were
therefore tantamount to a sub silentio overruling of the interstate
commerce-federal preemption element of McCready.
McCready's principal argument was that the exclusionary law
violated the privileges and immunities clause of article IV of the
Constitution. The clause had been interpreted three years earlier in
The Slaughter House Cases:
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that
whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your
own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on
their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the
measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your
jurisdiction.39
That arguifient did not prevail, however, as the Court held that
oyster beds were the common property of the commonwealth of
Virginia and that these rights of ownership were not affected by the
privileges and immunities clause.40 Therefore, the Court concluded
that the state could properly confine the use and enjoyment of the
resource to its own citizens:
[W]e think we may safely hold that the citizens of one State are
not invested by this clause of the Constitution with any interest
in the common property of the citizens of another State.41
The McCready opinion must be read as a determination that the
federal interests reflected in the privileges and immunities clause
38. 94 U.S. at 394.
39. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873). The privileges and immunities clause provides
that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
40. 94 U.S. at 395-96.
41. 94 U.S. at 395. The Court's "ownership" theory was derived in large part from
the case of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
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were not of sufficient consequence to warrant the invalidation of a
state law preferring state residents in the disposition of an
important state resource. The commonwealth of Virginia attempted
to convince the Douglas Court that the same rationale should apply
where federal interests in interstate commerce collide with the state's
interest in allocating its menhaden resources exclusively to state
residents. In its rejection of that argument, the Court revealed the
considerable erosion in the "state ownership" doctrine in the cases
subsequent to McCready:
The "ownership" language of cases such as those cited by
Virginia must be understood as no more than a 19th century
legal fiction expressing "the importance to its people that a state
have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an
important resource." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948);
see also Takahaski v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410,
420-421 (1948) under modem analysis, the question is simply
whether the State has exercised its police power in conformity
with the federal laws and Constitution. As we have demon-
strated above, Virginia has failed to do so here.42
The Douglas Court also rejected an "ownership" argument
based upon the Submerged Lands Act.43 While recognizing that the
Act "does give the States 'title,' 'ownership,' and the 'right and
power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use' the lands
beneath the oceans and natural resources in the waters within state
territorial jurisdiction," the Court observed, nonetheless, that the Act
reserved for the United States all constitutional powers of regulation
and control for commerce and other purposes.44 Thus, whatever
interest a state may claim in migratory finfish in its navigable
waters, it is not, on the Court's analysis, sufficient to permit the
exclusion of nonresident fishermen whose vessels are licensed under
an act of Congress.
It would appear that, in the wake of the Douglas decision, the
"state ownership" theory has lost most of its vitality. Douglas
42. 431 U.S. at 284-85.
43. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1970).
44. 431 U.S. at 284-85.
45. Note that the McCready case has not been expressly overruled, and the
Maryland Court of Appeals has declined an invitation to disregard it. In Bruce v.
Director, 261 Md. 585, 607-11, 276 A.2d 200, 211-13 (1971), the Maryland court noted
that while the validity of the state residency requirement was not in issue, it
considered that McCready retained sufficient authority to sustain those requirements.
261 Md. at 607-11, 276 A.2d at 211-13.
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seems to establish that the state ownership theory no longer has
legal significance apart from conventional constitutional analysis in
determining whether the state has exercised its police power in
conformity with the federal laws and Constitution. 46 Ultimately,
therefore, the actions of a state in controlling access to its oyster
fishery by persons other than federal licensees must be examined to
determine whether protected privileges and immunities of nonresi-
dents are unlawfully denied, whether residency classifications
violate the equal protection clause, whether an unlawful interference
with interstate commerce is created, and whether a valid federal law
preempts the attempted restriction. Legal analysis under each of
these theories may properly take into consideration legitimate state
interests. 47
In Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission,48 a case decided
after Douglas, the Supreme Court has shed some light on the
likelihood of a successful attack on the Maryland residency
requirement under the. privileges and immunities clause. Baldwin
reinforced the proposition in McCready that a state's disposition of
its common property resources need not be affected by the privileges
and immunities clause. The case involved a constitutional challenge
to Montana laws which required nonresidents to pay twenty-five
times as much as residents were charged for a license to hunt elk.
The plaintiffs, hunting guides and nonresident elk hunters, claimed
that the discriminatory license fees violated both the privileges and
immunities clause and the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause. 49
In examining the plaintiffs' privileges and immunities argu-
ment, the Court stated:
Some distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely
reflect the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual
States, and are permitted; other distinctions are prohibited
because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or the develop-
ment of a single union of those States. Only with respect to those
"privileges" and "immunities" bearing upon the vitality of the
Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens,
resident and nonresident, equally.50
46. 431 U.S. at 284-85.
47. Justice Rehnquist, in Douglas, acknowledged the continuing relevance of
legitimate state interests. 431 U.S. at 287-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
48. 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978).
49. Id. at 1854-55.
50. Id. at 1860.
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The Court weighed the respective state and federal interests in
recreational hunting for elk in Montana, concluded that "[e]quality
in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or well-
being of the Union,"51 and dismissed the hunters' privileges and
immunities claim:
Appellants do not - and cannot - contend that they are
deprived of a means of a livelihood by the system or of access to
any part of the State to which they may seek to travel. We do not
decide the full range of activities that are sufficiently basic to
the livelihood of the Nation that the States may not interfere
with a nonresident's participation therein without similarly
interfering with a resident's participation. Whatever rights
or activities may be "fundamental" under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, we are persuaded, and hold, that elk
hunting by nonresidents in Montana is not one of them.52
Thus, it is clear that state ownership remains an important
consideration under modern privileges and immunities clause
analysis, despite the language in Douglas which denigrated the
"state ownership" talisman. According to Baldwin, "the fact that
the State's control over wildlife is not exclusive and absolute in the
face of federal regulation and certain federally protected interests
does not compel the conclusion that it is meaningless in their
absence."53
In decisions interpreting the equal protection clause, legislative
classifications have been upheld on the basis of local economic
interests such as a "State's legitimate interest in encouraging
employment, ' '54 a typical argument made in favor of restricting
access to a state's fisheries. Where neither a fundamental interest
nor an invidious discrimination is involved, the courts traditionally
allow the states great flexibility in the regulation of local economic
matters. The Supreme Court has stated that "when local economic
regulation is challenged solely as violating the equal protection
clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as
51. Id. at 1862.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1861.
54. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970). It should be noted, however,
that a state's power to bias employment opportunities in favor of its own residents is
subject to limitation under the privileges and immunities clause of art. IV, § 2. See,
e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 98 S. Ct. 2482, 2488-92 (1978); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
395-403 (1948).
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to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations. '55 Classifi-
cations based on residency, unlike those based on race or alienage,
have not been determined to be so invidious that justification must
be found in a compelling state interest.56 A simple residency
requirement, unlike a duration residency requirement, does not
restrain the fundamental right of interstate migration. 57 A colorable
argument can therefore be made that Maryland's residency
requirement for oystering does not violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, because it does not impinge upon a
fundamental right and can be justified as a rational means of
protecting various state interests. 58
Even the commerce clause, with its implicit prohibition of
unreasonable state-created impediments to interstate commerce, will
tolerate some state laws which affect commerce but which are
important to the health and welfare of residents of the state. As the
Court in Douglas noted,59 holders of federal vessel licenses moving
in interstate commerce may be required to comply with state laws
enacted for the conservation of fishery resources, such as gear
restrictions for oystering or restrictions for the abatement of
pollution.
Because legitimate local interests can be recognized by the
courts in determining whether a state residency discrimination
violates one of these constitutional provisions, attention must be
focused on the nature of Maryland's interest in limiting oyster
licenses to residents. Two interests emerge as the principal
justification for the discrimination: the state's proprietary claims to
the oyster beds, and the state's interest in the economic welfare of its
residents.
A plausible argument can be made that fixed, local resources of a
state - those which, unlike migratory birds or fish, are capable of
being controlled or possessed in the conventional sense - are part of
the wealth of the state which it can and must manage for the general
55. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
56. Arlington County Board v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5, rehearing denied, 434 U.S.
976 (1977). "The Constitution does not ...presume distinctions between residents
and non-residents of a local neighborhood to be invidious." Id. at 7.
57. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159, 166 (Alaska 1977), rev'd. on other grounds, 98
S. Ct. 2482 (1978); McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645,
646-47 (1976).
58. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 486: "[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States their views of
what constitutes wise economic or social policy." See also Baldwin v. Fish and Game
Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852, 1863-64 (1978).
59. 431 U.S. at 277.
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welfare of its residents. On occasion, courts have found this
rationale to be an adequate justification for state residency
discriminations when challenged under both the privileges and
immunities clause and the equal protection clause.60 In addition, the
distinction between fixed or "sedentary" fish resources and those
which are mobile is recognized as a matter of international law.61 In
the resolution of disputes among nations competing in the coastal
fisheries, it is now generally accepted that a government may
appropriately claim the exclusive right to control the harvest of
sedentary resources such as shellfish, but not the highly mobile fish
species.6 2 A state's claim of a proprietary interest in its shellfish beds
does not strain the traditional concept of property and cannot be
dismissed as merely an archaic legal fiction, as claims to migratory
birds and fish have been dismissed.63 Although Douglas casts doubt
on the vitality of the state ownership doctrine, 64 that decision dealt
solely with access to a highly mobile finfish.
The Court has also recognized, in McCready, that a fixed
resource such as an oyster bed can be conserved and cultivated to
yield a greater harvest if a state's proprietary interests are
recognized and preserved.65 A state such as Maryland might contend
that its oyster management program has created, in effect, a
statewide oyster "farm" which is partially subsidized out of general
60. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. at 1862; State v.
Norton, 335 A.2d 607 (Me. 1975).
61. Comment, Alaska's Regulation of King Crab on the Outer Continental Shelf,
6 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REv. 375, 379-86 (1977).
62. See, e.g., Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1802(4), (14) (1976).
63. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. at 284; Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. at 402; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
64. A state does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private
game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of "owning" wild fish, birds, or
animals. Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a
hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced
to possession by skillful capture.
431 U.S. at 284.
65. The planting of oysters in the soil covered by water owned in common by
the people of the State is not different in principle from that of planting corn
upon dry land held in the same way. Both are for the purposes of cultivation
and profit; and if the State, in the regulation of its public domain, can grant to
its own citizens the exclusive use of dry lands, we see no reason why it may
not do the same thing in respect to such as are covered by water. And as all
concede that a State may grant to one of its citizens the exclusive use of a part
of the common property, the conclusion would seem to follow, that it might by
appropriate legislation confine the use of the whole to its own people alone.
94 U.S. at 396 (dictum).
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state revenues. 66 If nonresidents were allowed to invade Maryland's
oyster bars, the state would no longer have a significant incentive to
manage the resource as it does at present.67
Conservation of Maryland's oyster resource requires some type
of limitation on harvesting effort. Restricting gear types imposes an
obvious inefficiency on the efforts of the waterman, and may
increase the physical hardship of the labor.68 In order to control
resident and nonresident fishing effort, daily or seasonal limits
might have to be so drastically reduced that no individual waterman
could harvest enough oysters to earn a living.69 Thus, a limit on the
total number of oystermen, rather than the utilization of various
means of limiting the harvest alone, may be very important for
purposes of conservation. It can therefore be argued that the
combination of conservation interests and "the State's legitimate
interest in encouraging employment" justifies the restriction of the
limited employment opportunities in Maryland's oyster fishery to
state residents.70 As Justice Frankfurter once said, "[i]t is not
conceivable that the framers of the Constitution meant to obliterate
all special relations between a State and its citizens." 71
These arguments, though persuasive in themselves, are not
likely to prevail when balanced against federal interests in a free
interstate market unconstrained by local economic prejudices. The
exclusion of nonresidents is not essential for the protection of a
state's property in oysters. Other types of fixed natural resources
owned by a state, such as standing timber, farmland, oil, gas and
other minerals on state lands, are typically developed by renting the
66. In Toomer v. Witsell the Court indicated that a state has the power "to charge
nonresidents a differential which would merely compensate the State for any
conservation expenditures from taxes which only residents pay." 334 U.S. at 399.
Whether this justification for treating nonresidents differently from residents could be
extended to the exclusion of nonresidents presents a more difficult question.
67. This rationale was used by a federal district court in upholding Montana laws
imposing discriminatory license fees on nonresident elk hunters in Montana
Outfitters Action Group v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (D. Mont.
1976), aff'd. sub nom. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978). "[A]
legislature might, with some rationality conclude that a pure lottery open to all
potential elk hunters in the United States might destroy the political motivation to
Montana citizens to underwrite the elk management program in the absence of which
the species would disappear." See also, Note, Montana Outfitters v. Fish and Game
Commission: Of Elk and Equal Protection, 38 MONT. L. REV. 387 (1977).
68. See, e.g., Handscraping: Too Strenuous, 33 POTOMAC BASIN REP. No. 11 (Nov.
1977).
69. State v. Norton, 335 A.2d 607, 614 (Me. 1975).
70. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 486. See also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d
159 (Alaska 1977), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 2482 (1978); State v. Norton, 335 A.2d 607 (Me. 1975).
71. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. at 408 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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land or selling the resource to the highest bidder.72 The value of the
proprietary interest which is "taken" is returned to the state in the
form of rent payments or sale proceeds. It is only Maryland's method
of oyster management, which essentially allows oysters to be given
away to the waterman, which creates a spurious "need" for
residency discriminations as a means of safeguarding the state's
proprietary interests, 73 and it appears that the state ownership-
conservation theory cannot, therefore, justify the total exclusion of
nonresidents from the state's oyster bars.
The claim that Maryland's residency discriminations are
essential to the economic welfare of its residents leans upon a reed
more slender than that which supports its conservation of a state-
owned resource claim. 74 A state "may not use its admitted powers to
protect the health and safety of its people as a basis for suppressing
competition." 75 The right of nonresidents to bid for the opportunity
to rent or purchase a public resource on the same terms as residents
would seem to be assured under each of the constitutional provisions
considered above, particularly under the commerce clause:
The material success that has come to inhabitants of the
states which make up this federal free trade unit has been the
most impressive in the history of commerce, but the established
interdependence of the states only emphasizes the necessity of
protecting interstate movement of goods against local burdens
and repressions. We need only consider the consequences if each
of the few states that produce copper, lead, high-grade iron ore,
timber, cotton, oil or gas should decree that industries in that
state shall have priority. What fantastic rivalries and disloca-
tions and reprisals would ensue if such practices were begun.76
72. Under Maryland law the general procedure for the disposition of state
property requires only that it be "for a consideration adequate in the opinion of the
Board of Public Works." MD. CODE ANN. art. 78A, § 15 (1957).
73. Although Maryland exacts a severance tax of thirty-five cents per bushel of
oysters harvested from waters other than the Potomac River, all money collected must
be deposited in the Fisheries Research and Development Fund to be used exclusively
for the repletion of the natural oyster bars of the state. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 4-1020 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Because this tax is actually returned to the oysterman
through the benefits of the repletion program, it does not compensate the state in any
way for the value of its oyster resources which are harvested.
74. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). When the state of Missouri
advanced an ownership argument in its suit to enjoin enforcement of a federal treaty
regulating the taking of migratory birds, Justice Holmes wrote that "[t]o put the claim
of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed." Id.
75. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949).
76. 336 U.S. at 538-39.
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The Douglas Court reaffirmed its commitment to these princi-
ples, stating in dicta that the preemption of Virginia's residency
requirements for menhaden licenses was "very much in keeping with
sound policy considerations of federalism," 77 especially in regard to
the need for a free flow of interstate commerce in fish resources:
A number of coastal States have discriminatory fisheries laws,
and with all natural resources becoming increasingly scarce and
more valuable, more such restrictions would be a likely prospect,
as both protective and retaliatory measures. Each State's
fisherman eventually might be effectively limited to working in
the territorial waters of their residence, or in the federally
controlled fishery beyond the three-mile limit. Such proliferation
of residency requirements for commercial fishermen would
create precisely the sort of Balkanization of interstate commer-
cial activity which the Constitution was intended to prevent.78
Arguably, the significance of this language is limited by the factual
context of the case, involving the commercial harvest of migratory
finfish. That enterprise, the Court observed, "must be conducted by
peripatetic entrepreneurs moving, like their quarry, without regard
for state boundary lines. '79 Nonetheless, such a forceful and
unqualified statement by the Supreme Court is indicative of a
predisposition to consider residency discriminations in state fisher-
ies as inimical to federal interests in unhampered interstate
commerce.
This broad interpretation of Douglas is reinforced by the recent
Supreme Court rulings in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey" and
Hicklin v. Orbeck.81 The City of Philadelphia case involved a
challenge to a New Jersey law which prohibited the shipment of
wastes from outside the state for disposal in New Jersey landfills.
8 2
The Court determined that the state law created an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce, because it "impose[d] on out-of-state
interests the full burden of conserving the State's remaining landfill
space."8 3 In this respect the New Jersey law was comparable to
77. 431 U.S. at 285.
78. Id. at 285-86.
79. Id. at 285.
80. 98 S. Ct. 2531 (1978).
81. 98 S. Ct. 2482 (1978).
82. 98 S. Ct. at 2533.
83. Id. at 2537-39. The Court noted that it expressed no opinion about New
Jersey's power, consistent with the commerce clause, to restrict to state residents
access to state-owned resources. Id. at 2537, n.6.
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Maryland's residency requirements for oyster licenses, and it can be
argued that Maryland's imposition of the full burden of conserving
oyster resources upon nonresidents, rather than imposing a
nondiscriminatory method of limiting entry or otherwise limiting the
harvest, is similarly unconstitutional.
In Hicklin v. Orbeck the Court struck down an Alaska statute8 4
which required that every lease or contract for the development of
the state's oil and gas resources contain a term assuring the
preferential hiring of state residents. After finding the statute
violative of protected privileges and immunities, the Hicklin Court
described the complementary functions of the privileges and
immunities clause and the commerce clause in defining federal-state
relations:
Although appellants raise no Commerce Clause challenge to
the Act, the mutually reinforcing relationship between the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV and the Commerce
Clause - a relationship that stems from their common origin in
the Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation and their
shared vision of federalism, see Baldwin v. Montana Fish and
Game Comm'n, supra, - U.S. at - , 98 S. Ct. at 1858,
renders several Commerce decisions appropriate support for our
conclusion.... West and Pennsylvania v. West Virginia thus
established that the location in a given state of a resource bound
for interstate commerce is an insufficient basis for reserving the
benefits of the resource exclusively or even principally for that
State's residents. Foster Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 49 S.
Ct. 1, 73 L. Ed. 147 (1928), went one step further; it limited the
extent to which a State's purported ownership of certain
resources would serve as a justification for the State's economic
discrimination in favor of residents.
West, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, and Foster Packing
thus establish that the Commerce Clause circumscribes a State's
ability to prefer its own citizens in the utilization of natural
resources found within its borders, but destined for interstate
commerce .... Although the fact that a state owned resource is
destined for interstate commerce does not, of itself, disable the
State from preferring its own citizens in the utilization of that
resource, it does inform analysis under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause as to the permissibility of the discrimination
the State visits upon nonresidents based on its ownership of the
resource.85
84. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 38.40.010 to .090 (1977).
85. 98 S. Ct. at 2491-92.
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The Court ruled that, in view of the commercial significance of the
oil and gas of Alaska, the discrimination against nonresidents went
"far beyond the degree of resident bias Alaska's ownership of the oil
and gas can justifiably support. '86 A concluding quotation in
Hicklin recalled the vision of federalism underlying the Douglas
decision:
As Mr. Justice Cardozo observed in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935), the Constitution "was framed upon the
theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are
in union and not division. 87
As a result of the holding in Douglas on the issue of preemption,
a real possibility exists that the courts will determine that all
federally licensed vessels on the Chesapeake Bay engaged in fishing
and oystering s8 are entitled to harvest oysters in Maryland and
Virginia on the same terms as the residents of those states.
Furthermore, the principles of federalism announced in Douglas and
reinforced by Hicklin8 9 suggest that equal access to the substantial
commercial enterprise of oyster harvesting may well be impressed
with federal interests, deriving from the commerce and privileges
and immunities clauses, which mandate a similar result even as to
nonresidents who. have not obtained federal vessel licenses.
Maryland may therefore look forward to the day when peoples of the
86. Id. at 2492.
87. Id.
88. Records of the Coast Guard offices in the Chesapeake Bay region show a total
of 2,491 federally licensed fishing vessels, 1,786 engaged in fishing generally and 705
principally engaged in oystering. Letter from Eleanor P. Fischer, Chief, Records and
Publications Branch, Merchant Vessel Documentation Division, United States Coast
Guard, to Thomas B. Lewis (Feb. 3, 1978).
89. It is important to note, however, that Hicklin did not hold that state
regulations restricting nonresident access to resources in which the state has a
proprietary interest necessarily violate the privileges',.and immunities clause. The
Court recognized that a state's ownership of the property with which the statute is
concerned is an important factor to be considered in evaluating whether the
discrimination against noncitizens violates the privileges and immunities clause. 98
S. Ct. at 2490. In holding that Alaska's ownership of the oil and gas constituted
insufficient justification for the pervasive discrimination mandated by the challenged
statute, the Hicklin Court emphasized that: there must be a substantial reason for the
discrimination; there must be something to indicate that noncitizens constitute a
peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed; and the discriminatory
remedy must be closely tailored to the evil. Id. at 2488-89. Because the Alaska statute
failed to meet this test, going "far beyond the degree of resident bias Alaska's
ownership of the oil and gas [could] justify," id. at 2492, it was struck down as
violative of the privileges and immunities clause.
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several states will be sinking, swimming, and harvesting oysters
together in the waters of the state. But the question whether Justice
Cardozo's promise of prosperity and salvation will be realized
remains. It is clear, however, that Maryland and Virginia will be
allowed to impose nondiscriminatory fishery regulations which are
reasonably related to the conservation of their shellfish resources.90
Thus, the creation of a mobile, interstate work force will require each
state to reconsider the elements of its oyster management program.
Fortunately, there is an instructive and analogous precedent to
the elimination of state residency restrictions which the Douglas
decision forebodes. That precedent is the elimination of county
residency restrictions on Maryland commercial shellfish harvesters
as a result of the state court ruling in Bruce v. Director, Department
of Chesapeake Bay Affairs in 1971.91 Prior to the Bruce case,
Maryland law prohibited a waterman from taking oysters with hand
tongs or patent tongs in waters outside the county in which he
resided.92 Similar restraints applied to crabbers.93 The Maryland
Court of Appeals ruled that these statutes violated the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution and article 23 of the
Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution:
We think the statutes set forth an unlawful classification of
persons and discriminate not only among the several watermen
of the 13 tidewater counties in which crabs and oysters are found
in marketable quantities, but also between residents of these
counties and those who reside in Baltimore City and the 10
remaining counties of Maryland. In addition, we cannot see in
what way the restrictive nature of the statutory provisions bears
any reasonable relation to the public interest.94
As a result of this ruling, Maryland watermen have been allowed to
harvest oysters throughout the state without regard to boundaries.
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF Bruce
The changes in the Maryland oyster industry which occurred
following the Bruce decision were the subject of a study sponsored by
90. The majority opinion in Douglas stated that "reasonable and even handed
conservation measures, so essential to the preservation of our vital marine sources of
food supply, stand unaffected by our decision." 431 U.S. at 287. See also Manchester v.
Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855).
91. 261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971).
92. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 700 (1970).
93. Id. §322.
94. 261 Md. at 601, 276 A.2d at 208.
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the University of Maryland Sea Grant Program. 95 The results of this
study indicate that increased waterman mobility resulted in
increased fishing effort wherever in the state oyster densities were
greatest. The considerations which influence a waterman's decision
to seek shellfish outside his own county waters are similar to those
which would influence watermen to cross state lines if residency
requirements were eliminated. The effects of the increase in mobility
since the Court of Appeal's decision in Bruce should demonstrate, on
a somewhat smaller scale, what might be expected to result if
watermen were permitted to move freely through the Maryland and
Virginia portions of the Chesapeake Bay. Thus, an understanding of
changes in the Maryland oyster industry in the years since the
Bruce decision should assist fisheries managers in anticipating the
consequences of an elimination of state residency requirements.
Factors Affecting and Affected by Watermen Mobility
To examine changes that have occurred in the Maryland oyster
industry since Bruce, it is necessary to appreciate the factors that
would motivate a waterman to move to a new area and forego
harvesting in his usual area of operation. It is also necessary to
understand how the aggregate movement of watermen tends to
change factors that are important to fisheries managers in the state
of Maryland. Several of the factors that motivate individual
watermen to move are also the factors that are of interest to state
policy makers.
In deciding whether to seek out new oyster bars, the fundamen-
tal consideration of the waterman is an economic one: will daily
profits in a new area be sufficient to offset the daily profits in his
usual area plus the transportation cost of getting to the new area?96
If two alternative areas of harvest are under consideration, the
factors which influence his economic decision are:
1) the daily catch that can be obtained in each of the two areas;
2) the price of oysters landed in each area; and
3) the cost of transitting between the current area of harvest
and the alternative area.
95. A mathematical description of the decision environment is contained in the
Appendix and only its salient features are discussed here.
96. There are other considerations such as safety which are beyond the scope of
.this analysis.
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Daily catches and prices also bear on fisheries management
decisions. Daily catch rates are a measure of abundance, a factor of
obvious concern to fisheries managers. Declining oyster populations
are usually detected by drops in the average daily catch of the
watermen. Precipitous drops in the past have prompted Maryland
and Virginia to undertake programs to replenish the oyster
populations. The measure of success of the repletion programs is
greater abundance of oysters as represented by daily landings.
The Bruce decision resulted in a systematic alteration of the
pattern of average daily catch rates and prices among Maryland
counties. Daily catch rates became nearly equalized across the
counties, and the price relationship among counties stabilized with
watermen in counties closest to major marketing areas receiving the
highest dockside price.
Impacts of Intercounty Mobility on Average Daily Catches
To determine how the Bruce decision affected oyster bar
densities among the counties in Maryland, data on harvesting effort
(total annual boat-days) and average daily catch in each county
were gathered and compiled for the period from 1964 to 1975. 97
During the early portion of the period (1964-1971), oystermen were
restricted from harvesting oysters in the waters of another county.
Unrestricted movement was allowed in the latter portion.
The trends in average daily landings in Anne Arundel County
(AAC) and Talbot County (TC) illustrate in Figure 1 the change that
occurred after 1971. The ratio of daily landings in AAC to TC forms
an index of comparative advantage between the counties. Whenever
the index rises above one, catches are better in AAC and there is an
advantage to oyster there. TC is the better alternative when the ratio
goes below one.
Effort rose very slowly in AAC and generally declined in TC
over the 1964-1971 period (Figure 1). The AAC increase resulted
from either new watermen, watermen fishing more annual boat-
days, watermen who changed county residence, or watermen who
were in violation of the law but felt expected profits were greater
than expected fines. Fishing effort in AAC rose on an average of one
thousand boat-days per year, whereas TC lost about one thousand
boat-days per year.
97. Data were obtained from the Department of Natural Resources, State
Government of Maryland.
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Figure 1. Effort for Anne Arundel and Talbot
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The reason for this gradual shift in effort is illustrated in Figure
2. Good conditions for oyster reproduction 98 and Maryland's
repletion program increased densities in AAC relative to TC. In
1968, an average day on an Anne Arundel oyster bar produced
twenty-six bushels of oysters compared to an average of eighteen in
TC. The shift of harvesting effort to AAC, however, influenced the
counties' relative productivity so that, by the time of the Bruce
decision, oyster densities were nearly the same.
The freedom to move among counties should have the effect of
increasing the rate of change in county effort and also reducing the
likelihood of productivity ratio deviations from one. Both of these
effects are shown in Figures 1 and 2 for the post-Bruce period. The
increase in effort in TC was obviously rapid between 1971 and 1975,
averaging around eight thousand additional boat-days per year. The
impact of this rapid movement on oyster density is very pronounced
when the average product ratio is observed. The ratio remained very
stable after 1971 (ranging from .72 to .80), whereas it varied
98. The spatfall of 1963 in Anne Arundel's Severn and South Rivers was the
largest recorded in the period 1939-1975. D. Meritt, Oyster Spat Set on Natural Clutch
in the Maryland Portion of the Chesapeake Bay (1939-1975) (Feb. 1977) (unpublished
Special Report No. 7 on file at University of Maryland Center for Environmental and
Estuarine Studies). These oysters began to reach commercial size in 1967 and served
as the foundation for landings in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
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markedly (ranging from .8 to 2.1) in the years prior to the Bruce
decision. In essence, at any time when landings per boat were
greater in TC, AAC oystermen chose to transfer their fishing efforts
to TC. The greater stability in the average product ratio was a direct
result of greater variation in effort between counties.
Although the visual representation in Figures 1 and 2 is
convincing, it is also possible to determine statistically whether the
Bruce decision has had an impact on the relative oyster densities by
considering the relative densities in the pre-Bruce period as a control
sample and the relative densities after the Bruce decision as a
sample that has been "treated" by the decision. The hypothesis that
the decision had no effect on the relative oyster densities was tested
using an F-test (see Appendix, Table 1) and rejected at the 95%
confidence level.
To determine whether the shifts in fishing effort between AAC
and TC were indicative of statewide changes, data on average
productivity and effort were also analyzed and compared for Talbot
and Queen Anne's counties (QAC). In this analysis, pre-Bruce
conditions were similar to those in the first case. The average
productivity of a boat-day in QAC had exceeded the TC figure since
1966. By 1970, an average boat-day in Queen Anne's County
provided about thirteen more bushels of oysters than in Talbot
County. The Bruce decision and the ensuing mobility equalized the
Figure 2. Average Productivity Ratio for Anne Arundel
and Talbot Counties
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average productivity within one year so that, in the 1971 season, a
boat-day in either county yielded an average of thirty-three bushels.
Figure 3 illustrates this effect graphically, and the results of an
analysis of a variance test on the effects of the Bruce decision allows
rejection of the hypothesis that the average product ratios behaved
in the same manner before and after Bruce (Appendix, Table 1). It
can therefore be stated with confidence that the statewide shifts in
fishing effort were attributable to the Court of Appeals decision in
Bruce.
To extend the analysis beyond a county-to-county movement
and demonstrate what could happen between adjacent states, the
data were aggregated and analyzed on a Western Shore-Eastern
Shore basis. The daily landings in counties on the Western Shore of
the Chesapeake Bay were averaged and divided by the average daily
landing in counties on the Eastern Shore. This relative regional
density was then examined to test whether the Bruce decision had
regional impacts.
Figures 4 and 5 show the levels of effort and average
productivity in Western and Eastern Shore counties. Prior to the
Bruce decision, the oyster density on the Eastern Shore was lower
than that of the Western Shore because of good Western Shore oyster
reproduction.99 At the time of the Bruce decision, the relative density
Figure 3. Average Productivity Ratio for Queen Annes
and Talbot Counties
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Figure 4. Effort' for Western and Eastern Shores of
the Chesapeake Bay
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of Western Shore oysters was declining, causing an exodus from the
Western Shore and an increase in effort on the Eastern Shore. The
relative density of oysters in the regional analysis stabilized just as
in the county analysis. Statistically, the regional impact of Bruce is
highly significant (Appendix, Table 1). Thus, it can be stated with
some certainty that the elimination of county residency restrictions
has had a substantial effect on the mobility in Maryland oyster
fishery and on the densities of oysters across the state.
Costs of Mobility and Mobility Restrictions
Using equation 4 in the Appendix, it is possible to calculate the
costs incurred by oystermen whenever they transit from AAC to TC.
In essence, oystermen will transit from AAC to TC if transit costs
are less than the difference between daily net income in TC and
AAC. If one assumes that oystermen will move until transit costs
just equal the difference, then data on daily net income in the two
counties can be used to estimate transit costs. The calculations,
based on the data presented in the graphs, indicate that the transit
costs for one boat-day were less than six dollars over the period
1971-1975, averaging $3.60 (Appendix, Table 2). This figure repre-
sents the costs of gasoline and other pecuniary outlays.
It is also interesting to calculate the costs that were imposed on
watermen in TC in the pre-Bruce period by the mobility restrictions.
The negative travel costs calculated (Appendix, Table 2) are an
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Figure 5. Average Productivity Ratio for Western and
Eastern Shores of the Chesapeake Bay
APW/APE
BRUCE DECISION
2.0-
RENDERED
1.0-
APw/ AP E
0.5
I I I I I I I I I I I I
lss 1967 196 toll 1973 1275 TIME
indication of the additional revenue that a TC waterman would have
gained if he had spent a boat-day in AAC waters instead of TC
waters. For this purpose, it will be assumed that it costs the same to
transit from AAC to TC as it does from TC to AAC and that costs
have not changed substantially over the entire period of analysis.
Thus, by subtracting the transit costs computed in the post-Bruce
period from the additional revenues that could have been made
leaving TC for AAC, one obtains an estimate of the net dollar gains
a Talbot oysterman could have made by going to AAC for one boat-
day. Because existing Maryland law forbade that transit, the figure
also represents the average opportunity cost imposed on the
oysterman by the law invalidated by Bruce. The range of the
opportunity costs decrease from $10.00/boat-day in 1969 to nothing
in 1966, with an average of $4.00/boat-day from 1965 to 1970.
Similarly, transit costs incurred by the waterman travelling
between QAC and TC and the opportunity costs imposed by the
restriction of movement between those counties may also be
calculated from the data in the Appendix. Transit costs between
these counties, averaging $1.08 per boat-day, were less than in the
AAC-TC case ($3.60/boat-day). This is not an unreasonable estimate
as QAC and TC border one another and Eastern Bay and travel
costs should be lower but not negligible. The opportunity costs, on
the other hand, were larger in this case and averaged about $4.80 per
boat-day. This is primarily due to the larger differences in oyster
[VOL. 38
DOUGLAS V. SEACOAST PRODUCTS, INC.
densities in QAC and TC before the Bruce decision and to lower
transportation costs.
Opportunity costs calculated for the Eastern Shore watermen
who were barred from Western Shore oyster bars were greater than
those found in the regional comparisons. Transit costs derived from
aggregated Western Shore/Eastern Shore data averaged $11.20 per
boat-day for the post-Bruce period, about three times the cost of a
transit between AAC and TC. When calculated using this cost figure,
average opportunity costs per day for Eastern Shore fishermen for
the five years prior to the Bruce decision are $5.38. Given the
magnitude of the opportunity costs imposed by the county residency
requirements, it is not surprising that watermen challenged the
legitimacy of the law.
Impacts on County Price Patterns
The changes in oyster densities occurring after the Bruce
decision has a substantial impact on dockside price patterns among
the counties. Prior to Bruce, prices among counties varied widely and
randomly. No one county's price was consistently the highest. When
random events such as good spatfall or the opening of closed
shellfish area changed the oyster density in one county, creating
large supplies, low prices were generated for several years because
fishing effort could not be rapidly shifted to take advantage of the
Figure 6. Average Price Per Pound (Weighted Average)
AVERAGE PRICE
(ets pe, pound)
BRUCE DECISION
RENOERED
ANNES
TIME
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higher yields so as to increase landings and depress prices. The
random price pattern which resulted is illustrated in Figure 6 for
three of Maryland's counties for the period 1964 to 1971.
After 1971, however, a much more stable and predictable pattern
of county oyster prices emerged. It would be expected that, all other
things being equal, oysters landed in the county closest to the
principal marketing center would bring the highest dockside price
because the wholesalers' shipping costs would be the lowest. This
expectation is confirmed in Figure 6. Since 1972, Anne Arundel
County oyster landings have consistently commanded the highest
prices, presumably because of the short distance from Baltimore, the
principal market for processed products. During this period, oyster
densities have remained relatively equal among the counties, as
discussed above.
The Consequences of Eliminating State Residency
Requirements for Oystermen
An understanding of the basic differences in the Maryland and
Virginia oyster fisheries is necessary to project properly the lessons
of Maryland's experiences with intercounty mobility to an interstate
Chesapeake Bay oystery. Thorough studies of the respective state
oyster programs have been made,100 but the essential characteristics
may be digested as follows:
1) The average productivity of public oyster grounds is thought
to be lower in Virginia than in Maryland. 10
2) Private oyster leases in Virginia cover about ten times the
area leased in Maryland.102
100. See, e.g., Alford, The Role of Management in Chesapeake Oyster Production,
63 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 44 (1973); D. Haven, W. Hargis & P. Kendall, The Oyster
Industry of Virginia: Its Status, Problems and Promise (1978) (unpublished; on file at
Virginia Institute of Marine Science); R. Suttor, The Chesapeake Bay Oyster
Fisheries: An Econometric Analysis (1970) (miscellaneous publication No. 740 on file
at Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Maryland).
101. It is difficult to make comparisons on boat-days between the states because
methods and efficiencies vary substantially; however, on the Potomac River, where
both states have access, Virginians land far greater amounts of oysters. In December
1976, for example, Virginians landed over 200 times the amount that Marylanders
landed. Obviously, there are more opportunities to get to denser oyster beds in
Maryland.
102. VIRGINIA COMMISSIONER OF MARINE RESOURCES, ANNUAL REPORTS (1975)
(reports around 100,000 leased acres in Virginia in 1974, whereas personal
communication by the authors with Mr. F. Sieling of Maryland's Department of
Natural Resources revealed 9,025 acres in Maryland 1977).
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3) There are over two thousand federally licensed fishermen
around the Bay, seven hundred of whom are principally
engaged in oystering.103
It would appear that some portion of the licensed Virginia
watermen would have an incentive to enter Maryland waters to
oyster, at least insofar as the greater returns for a given amount of
effort offset transit costs. The extent of such movement is difficult to
predict, however, and may be affected by non-economic considera-
tions. For example, one might expect Virginia watermen on the
Western Shore to take advantage of the new mobility more readily
than those on the Eastern Shore. Along the Potomac River, which
divides the states on the Bay's Western Shore, there has been a long
tradition of intermingling of Maryland and Virginia watermen.10 4
These watermen may have less reluctance to expand their efforts to
the public grounds in the Patuxent River, for example, than
watermen on Virginia's Eastern Shore. Isolation and strong
community feelings may deter a rapid influx of Virginians into
Maryland waters along the Eastern Shore.
Just as the elimination of county residency requirements
resulted in an equalization in oyster densities among the counties,
the elimination of state residency requirements permits a transfer of
effort by Virginians to the more productive Maryland oyster bars.
Because the transfer of effort will initially be toward Maryland,
Virginia oysters will be spared in the short run. An equilibrium in
regional densities should be achieved rapidly, as in the post-Bruce
period, after which the concentration of effort will be drawn toward
particular areas of greater abundance, as determined by a good
spatfall, seeding efforts, or the opening of previously closed shellfish
grounds, and away from poorer, less productive grounds which may
be affected by disease, pollution, predators, ice or other problems.
Interstate mobility will exacerbate the tendency of the individ-
ual waterman to place a higher priority on immediate returns rather
than on long-term productivity of the public bars. In the case of a
private, leased bed, on the other hand, the lessee is most likely to
adopt management practices oriented toward conservation and long-
term productivity 0 5 because he has the greatest incentive to defer
present harvesting to assure future propagation. During the period
prior to the Bruce decision, each waterman shared the oyster
103. See note 88 supra.
104. Historically, access to the Potomac River has been shared by Maryland and
Virginia residents. MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 4-306 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
105. See discussion in Power, More About Oysters, supra note 1, at 200.
19781
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
grounds of his county only with other county residents. The resource
was not exclusive, but within this limited "commons" it was possible
that the waterman could still view deferred production as being
within his economic self-interest. However, as these bars are opened
to all state residents, and eventually to any waterman at all, the
economic incentive of the individual to maximize immediate gains
from the available oyster resources must take greater precedence.
The aggregate expression of individuals' depleting behavior would
be a redistribution of state landings from the future into the present.
The management practices of the states must therefore be prepared
to restrain this tendency.
Even after densities in each state have become equalized due to
interstate mobility of oystermen, the Virginia oyster industry as a
whole will be less vulnerable to the effects of a shifting oyster fleet.
This mobility will affect only public bars and a far greater part of
the Virginia industry than the Maryland industry depends upon the
use of privately leased oyster grounds. It is unlikely that non-
residents will immediately claim the right to disenfranchise private
leaseholders. Thus the infiltration of nonresidents into the privately
leased grounds in Virginia will be controlled by the manner
prescribed by state law for applying for the right to lease a given
tract.106 While in each state private leases are presently limited to
residents, 10 7 these restrictions appear to be as vulnerable to
constitutional challenge as the more general ban on nonresident
oystermen.
Again, the state ownership theory provides no logical justifica-
tion for the exclusion of nonresident lessees because the value of the
use of the property is paid to the state as rent. The nonresident
lessee, therefore, would not take or even share in the common
property of the state. The state, as a lessor of real property, is no
more immune to the requirements of the fourteenth amendment 08
106. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§4-1108 to 1118 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-4, 28.1-108 to 118.1 (1950 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
107. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1108(a), -1112(b) (1974); VA. CODE § 28.1-122
(1950).
108. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). An
argument might be made that a state could lawfully prohibit an alien from acquiring
a property interest, such as a leasehold, within its borders. See, e.g., Blythe v.
Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1901).
[But] [riecently the Court has taken a more restrictive view of the powers
of a State to discriminate against non-citizens with respect to public
employment, compare Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), aff g People v.
Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, and Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915),
with Sugarman v. Dougall [413 U.S. 634 (1973)] . . . and with respect to the
distribution of public funds and the allocation of public resources, compare
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and commerce clause than it is in its capacity as regulator of
fisheries within state waters.
The twenty-year duration of individual private leases in
Maryland and Virginia will slow the influx of newcomers even if
nonresidents do become eligible to hold such leases. Further delay
would result from laws which give preference to existing lease-
holders for the right to renew their leases. Such a preference has
some justification as a sound conservation measure as the lessee, in
this circumstance, is encouraged to employ practices likely to result
in the greatest long-term yield. If the right to renew were assured,
the lessee would not be inclined to deplete his oyster beds at the end
of the lease period.
The Douglas opinion emphasized that "reasonable and even-
handed conservation measures, so essential to the preservation of
our vital marine sources of food supply, stand unaffected by our
decision."'10 9 Certainly, the conservation of the fishery through the
use of long-term oyster leases would be found to be reasonable, but
preferences in lease renewals are more doubtful. While the wide-
spread use of long-term, renewable private oyster leases in a state's
management program would serve to buffer the impacts resulting
from nonresident fishermen, it would also perpetuate the exclusion
of nonresidents. In other circumstances, limited entry schemes
which allowed preferences to prior holders of fishing licenses have
been declared unconstitutional where the effect was to exclude
nonresidents. 110 However, the need for continuity in oyster leases
may be found to justify the discriminatory effects."'
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877), and Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232
U.S. 138 (1914), with Graham v. Richardson, [403 U.S. 365 (1971)] . . .and
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, [334 U.S. 410 (1948)].
Examining Board v. Flores de Ortero, 426 U.S. 572, 604 (1976). This argument would
have no application to nonresidents who are not aliens and who seek oyster leases.
109. 431 U.S. at 287.
110. Grandfather provisions in state fishing license laws which effectively exclude
nonresidents have been found unconstitutional. In Reetz v. Bozanich, 297 F. Supp. 300
(D. Alaska 1969), vacated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), a federal court held
that state laws which limited the total number of licenses and which granted
preferential treatment to previous license holders violated the equal protection clause.
The principal authority for that holding, Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), was
subsequently overruled in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). See also Dobard
v. State, 149 Tex. 332, 233 S.W.2d 435 (1950), discussed in Comment, The
Constitutionality of a Program Restricting the Number of Commercial Fishermen in
the Coastal Waters of the United States, 34 LA. L. REV. 801, 816 (1974); Note, Massey
v. Apollonio: Is Residency an Impermissible Conservation Device?, 6 ENV. L. 543
(1976).
111. Note that Maryland law also prohibits corporations from leasing private
oyster beds. This provision limits the size of the economic unit engaged in oyster
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Maryland currently subsidizes its oyster repletion program at a
cost of nearly one million dollars per year, in addition to revenues
generated by inspection and severance taxes. 112 When the benefits of
the repletion program are no longer confined to state residents,
political support for continuing the subsidy will decline. If the
repletion program is essential for the maintenance of productivity on
public bars, then oyster taxes would have to be increased until
sufficient revenues are generated to fund the entire program without
subsidization.113 Note that even when taxes are raised to the point
where the costs of the repletion program are covered, the state
receives no net benefit in exchange for oysters harvested.
With the elimination of state residency requirements for
oystermen, the states of Maryland and Virginia would have an
unprecedented need for the development of a joint management
program. The Potomac River Fisheries Compact, which provides for
joint management of one river, could serve as a model for an
enlarged Chesapeake Bay oyster management scheme. The coastal
zone management plans currently under development in both states
should be modified to accommodate the need for greater cooperation
in fisheries management as state residency restrictions are elimi-
nated.
In summary, the Maryland oyster industry, like the fisheries in
many coastal states, stands in a precarious position as a result of the
Douglas decision. Without the insulation provided by state residency
restrictions, public oyster bars will be exposed to more intensive
fishing effort. The state should plan now to restructure its oyster
management program to protect its property interest in state oyster
grounds, to avoid subsidizing nonresident oystermen out of general
state revenues, and to encourage more widespread cultivation of
privately leased oyster beds.
cultivation and the capital resources available for that activity. Also, the discrimina-
tion against corporations may be invalid under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See Edwards v. Leaver, 102 F. Supp. 698 (D.R.I. 1952); Power,
More About Oysters, supra note 1, at 219-20.
112. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §4-1020(c) (1977).
113. It should be noted that Maryland might also be able to retain the subsidy and
impose a disproportionate oyster tax burden on nonresidents. See note 66 supra.
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APPENDIX
The economic rationale describing the mobility of a waterman
can be represented by a simple mathematical model. For illustrative
purposes, the model will be established for an oysterman living in
County A and having the option of oystering in County T. The
oysterman's economic problem is how to obtain the greatest profits
or income from allocating his fishing effort between the two
counties. This can be represented as a mathematical optimization
problem:
1. Maximize L = PA * FA (XA, DA) - CA (XA)
+ PT F T (XT , DT) C T(X T)- M - T
where:
L is profit,
XT, XA are boat-days in counties T and A,
PTV PA are prices per pound in counties T and A,
FT (...) F A(...) are oyster landings produced by boat-
days (X) and oyster density (D) in counties T and A,
DT , DA are densities of oysters in counties T and A,
CT (,..), C (..°)are total costs of boat-days in coun-A
ties T and A, M is the cost per trip of transitting from county
AtoT.
For the oysterman to fish both counties and maximize his
profits, the following conditions must be met:
2a. aL/3X T = PT(aFTaXT ) - aCT/aXT - M = 0
2b. 3L/aXA = PA(3FA/3X A ) - 3CA /X A = 0
The meaning of equation 2a is simply that the waterman will
work only in county T until that daily income PT (3FT/aXT) isT T T
1978]
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equal to the daily costs he incurs (CT/3XT + M) working there,
the cost of working in T plus the cost of travel. If he works more
days, his daily costs will exceed his returns. The meaning of equality
2b is very similar except the waterman now measures daily returns
in county A, PA(3FA1aXA), against daily costs of working in
county A (C /aX A). There are no transit expenses (M).
Together, equations 2a and 2b suggest that:
3. PT(3FT/BXT ) - aCT aXT - M = PA(FA/aXA) - CA/X A
That is, days are allocated so that marginal profits in county T must
equal marginal profits in county A. One may reasonably assume
that anytime a day in county T earns more than a day in county A,
the waterman will fish in county T.
To test the relationship as stated in equation (3) with available
data, two simplifying assumptions will be made:
(a) The marginal product (aF/ X) of a boat trip in a county is
equivalent to the average annual product of a boat trip (AP)
in that county;
(b) The marginal cost of a boat trip in county
T(C T/X T ) equals the marginal cost of a boat trip in
county A ( CA/aXA).
With these assumptions, it is now possible to develop an equation
that shows the variables affecting intercounty mobility and that are.
available to use in the model. The following equalities are derived
from equation 3 and the two assumptions:
4. Average income per day in Talbot County = Average
income per day in Anne Arundel County, plus the daily
cost of travelling from Anne Arundel to Talbot County
(PT " APT = PA " APA + m).
Equation 4 relates the principal factors which are important
determinants of intercounty mobility: oyster prices in the respective
counties, the density of oysters (inferred from average productivity),
and the costs of travelling from county A to county T.
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